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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to deduce an equation for the demand for cigarettes by 
explicitly incorporating the information disseminating health hazards of smoking within the 
analytical framework of utility maximization. That is, the paper provides a deductive 
argument to derive a testable hypothesis that the information dissemination reduces the 
demand for cigarettes, besides clarifying the other properties of the cigarette demand 
function. 
The initial motivation behind this paper lies in this author's discovery, when Yimin Zhou, 
the co-author of our earlier paper, and this author decided to write a paper on the impact of 
information and knowledge on cigarette consumption, that most of the authors merely posit 
their statement of hypothesis in the form of a testable equation without deducing it within 
some analytical framework of optimization; and, further, that information was not 
incorporated as a variable , though some authors examined the impacts on the demand for 
cigarettes of their positive and negative advertising and the1964 U. S. Surgeon General's 
Report in their empirical studies. It was the purpose of this author to formally incorporate 
and deduce information as part of the statement of hypothesis expressed in the form of the 
cigarette demand equation derived within a utility maximization model, instead of merely 
positing such statement of hypothesis (i.e., the equation). This objective has lead the 
author to study the subject of information in some depth. 
George J. Stigler launched information as a subject of economic analysis almost forty 
years ago. I) His study took place within the framework of the "economics of search" in 
today's jargon. Since then, the economics of information has expanded into several 
1) R.H. Coase, in Essays on Economics and Economists (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1994), 
204, cites, as George J. Stigler's major contribution to economic theory prompting the Swedish 
Academy to special commendation, his "The Economics of Information," originally published in 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXIX, NO.3 (June, 1961): 213-225, and later reprinted in his book, 
The Organization of Industry (Homewood, III.: R. D. Irwin, 1968), 171-190. It is worth noting that 
Stigler in section 3 of his article examines advertising from the perspective of buyers as an 
instrument to learn of sellers' identities (e.g., price, quality, location, etc.). 
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directions: contracts, moral hazard, adverse selection, insurance policy design, design of an 
incentive mechanism, principal-agent relations, advertising, signaling, and the impact of 
information on Pareto efficiency of a competitive market. 2) All these areas of the study of 
information stem from the fact that the costs of acquisition and dissemination of 
information are significant and vary among individuals and other economic agents. 
Information is clearly recognized as a vital resource. It is so vital that information has 
been referred to as "second capital." 3) It will be unambiguously clear that the perception of 
information (and knowledge) as "second capital" occupies the central place of the current 
paper. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a revised and extended version of part of the 
paper, originally co-authored with Yimin Zhou, "Demand for Cigarettes in Japan: Impact 
of Knowledge and Information on Cigarette Consumption in Light of Japanese Prefectural 
Data," To be specific, this paper treats information and knowledge regarding health 
hazards of smoking as personal capital (or consumption capital) in the "household 
production function" (or the personal production function), a la Becker and Stigler.4) 
In another vein, the approach, a fa Becker and Stigler, adhered to in this paper, allows the 
author to deduce the differences in cigarette consumption per capita among the prefectures 
to differences in price, income per capita and the level of information dissemination, hence, 
sealing out any differences in tastes and preferences as a basis for differences in per capita 
cigarette consumption among prefectures. That is, the identical preference function is 
2) A few samples of the literature on these topics are given as follows: Gerald A. Feltham, Amin H. 
Amershi and William T. Ziemba (eds.), Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts: Essays in 
Honor of John E. Butterworth (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988); Brian Hillier, The 
Economics of AsymmetriC Information (New York: S1. Martin's Press, 1997); M. Pauly, "The 
Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment," American Economic Review (June 1968), 531-537; Phlips, 
Lous, The Economics of Imperfect Information (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988); Theodore Groves, Roy Radner and Stanley Reiter (eds.), Information, Incentives and 
Economic Mechanism: Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicsz (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987); G.C. Archibald, Information, Incentives and the Economics of Control (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Hiroaki Ishigaki, Essays on Advertising in Industrial 
Organization (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Purdue University, 1998); Michael 
Spence, "Job Market Signaling," Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1873), 355-374; and J. 
Stiglitz, "Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective," Economic Journal Supplement to 
Volume 95 (1985), 21-41; S. Shavell, "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (November 1979), 541-562; and G. A. Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1970),488-500. 
3) I have encountered the expression "second capital" some years ago but I am unable to identify either 
the writer's name or the work for citation. This expression conveys well the role of information and 
knowledge in the current paper. 
4) Gary Becker and George Stigler, "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American Economic Review, 
67, no.2 (1977): 76-90 and Gary S. Becker, "Preferences and Values," 1-23 in Gary S. Becker, 
Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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assumed for a representative consumer both within a prefecture as well as across the 
prefectures. It will be deduced that this personal capital affects the calculus of the "cost of 
smoking originating from within." To be exact, it will be shown in the next section that 
the greater is the level of information and knowledge, the higher (not lower) is the "cost 
of smoking originating from within," hence reducing the consumption of cigarettes, which, 
in turn, attenuate both personal and social costs of smoking in the form of medical 
expenses and lost incomes due to smoking-related sicknesses and deaths. 
This paper introduces information initially as a parameter; then, invoking the implicit 
function theorem, it derives the cigarette demand function as a function of income, prices 
and information; and, further, by using the envelope theorem, it will deduce the statement 
of hypothesis in the form of equation in which it will be concluded that the greater the level 
of dissemination of information and hence of knowledge regarding health hazards of 
smoking, the lower the level of per capita consumption of cigarettes, in addition to the 
familiar negative relationship between the price of cigarettes and their consumption per 
capita on the one hand, and the positive relationship between per capita income and per 
capita consumption of cigarettes on the other. 
For the detailed literature review on the study of the demand for cigarettes around the 
world, references, stylized facts on the Japanese consumption of cigarettes, the industrial 
organization of cigarette production and distribution in Japan, and the empirical study of 
the Japanese demand for cigarettes by using prefectural data, see Yorozu and Zhou (1999) 
which is the only study of this type available on Japanese smoking. 
2. Formulation of the Model 
The author pursues his inquiry in the following framework of constrained maximizing 
behavior. 
The consumer maximizes 
u = u(s, x) subject to s=h(c; /) and pc + qx =M, 
with the following notation: 
u = utility function 
s = smoking appreciation 
c = cigarettes 
x = composite market good 
h = household production function for smoking 
I = the level of dissemination of information about health hazards of smoking 
(1) 
(parameter) 
p = price of cigarettes (parameter) 
q = price of composite good (parameter) 
M = money income (parameter). 
The function u is a utility function which applies commonly to a representative 
consumers across all the prefectures; it is a function of "smoking appreciation" (not a 
function of cigarettes per se) and the composite market good embracing all other market 
goods; the function u is postulated to be increasing and concave in s and x and twice 
continuously differentiable; the function h is a "personal production function" through 
which the consumer "produces" "smoking appreciation" with cigarettes and the information 
on health hazards of smoking; the function h is also postulated to be increasing and 
concave in c and twice continuously differentiable. 
Two remarks are in order: (i) the notion of a representative consumer is invoked; i.e., all 
consumers within a prefecture as well as across the prefectures have the same preferences 
and, hence, this assumption will avert the exposition from slipping into a stalemate of 
concluding that people in one prefecture have a different cigarette consumption pattern 
from those in another prefecture because people in one prefecture have a different 
preference from those in another; the author must construct the model so that its conclusion 
will not hinge upon "differences in tastes,: as well articulated in Stigler and Becker (1977). 
Thus, the differences in the consumption of cigarettes between prefectures will be 
accounted for in terms of differences in income, price, and information dissemination. 
(ii) Though parameter 1 is not expressed in terms of accumulation as in Stigler and 
Becker, 1 may be referred to as a component of "consumption capital," "personal capital," 
or "human capital." These phrases express the earlier references to information as "second 
capital." 
By substitution, the optimization model in (1) can be rewritten as 
Maximize w( e, x;l) subject to pc + qx = M. (2) 
c,x 
The corresponding Lagrangian function is 
L(e, X,A) =w(e, x; I) +A (M - pc - qx) . (3) 
Ensuring the sufficient second-order condition to hold; i.e., the bordered Hessian 
determinant of the second partials of the Lagrangian being positive) and invoking the 
Implicit Function Theorem, from the set of the first-order conditions, we derive a set of 
choice functions (demand functions for cigarettes and composite market good and the 
function for marginal utility of money) as given below 
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e = e*(p, q, I, M) 
x = x*(p, q, J, M) 
A= A*(p, q, J, M). 
(4) 
By substituting these functions into the objective function in (2), we define the following 
maximum value function 
w*(p, q, J, M) w(e*(p, q, J, M), x*(p, q, J, M); J) (5) 
where w*(p, q, J, M) is most frequently referred to as the indirect utility function. 
Our task at hand is to deduce the characterization of the cigarette demand function. We 
deduce de / dp<O by deriving the Slutsky equation via the duality theory and the envelope 
theorem, and further by assuming that cigarettes are a normal good (i.e., de / dM>O), or 
more mildly assuming that at least cigarettes are not a Giffen good. 
To deduce the impact of information dissemination of health hazards of smoking on the 
consumption of cigarettes is slightly more complicated. The deduction process hinges on 
the following observation on the maximizing behavior depicted in (2). We observe that 
parameter I enters only the objective function and that it does not enter the constraint. 
Therefore, so long as the values of c and x are chosen and held so as to satisfy the 
constraint, the constraint has no binding effect on the choice of the maximizing value of 
parameter I. 
This observation simplifies the primal-dual analysis of the maximization problem to the 
following expression 
Maximize F(e, x, I) == w(c, x, I) - w*(l) . 
/ 
(6) 
The first-order condition gives the celebrated envelope result for the unconstrained 
maximization: 
(7) 
In view of (5) and (7), we have 
w; (J) == w/(C*(l), x*(l), I) . (8) 
Note that e*(1) and x*(l) are the suppressed versions of (4) with the understanding that 
parameter I does not enter the constraint and that the values of e and x are chosen and held 
so as to satisfy the constraint. 
Because, by construction, the primal-dual objective function (6) has a maximum value of 
zero, the sufficient second-order condition is: 
(9) 
Differentiating both sides of (8) with respect to I, we obtain 
(10) 
Imposing the sufficient second-order condition upon (10) and using Young's theorem yield: 
(11 ) 
The qualitative analysis of the impact of information dissemination on cigarette 
consumption is embodied in (11). However, the relation (11) does not lead to any specific 
refutable statement of hypothesis. That is, the assumptions that have been made heretofore 
are not sufficiently specific for this author to derive a specific property of the cigarette 
demand function in terms of the relation between c* (the quantity of cigarettes demanded 
and I (the level of dissemination of information on health hazards of smoking). Below will 
be made specific assumptions which are plausible enough to not invite any serious damage 
to the deductive process. 
Assuming safely that Wxl is zero (i.e., the dissemination of information on smoking-
hazards does not affect the marginal utility of consuming non-cigarette goods), we can 
derive the second characterization of the demand for cigarettes as expressed in (12). 
(12) 
Assuming again safely that Wc/ < 0 (i.e., the dissemination of information on smoking 
hazards reduces the marginal utility of cigarette consumption), the author is able to deduce 
the following statement of hypothesis: 
(13) 
Thus, it is now deduced that an increase in the level of dissemination of information on 
health hazards of smoking will reduce cigarette consumption. Therefore, we conclude that, 
at least theoretically, the dissemination of information on health hazards of smoking is an 
effective public health policy. 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
This deductive study of the demand for cigarettes was prompted by its peculiar backdrop: 
the extreme paucity of such studies in Japan, Japan topping the other industrialized 
countries in per capita consumption of tobacco, the tobacco industry having been a 
Japanese government monopoly, the absence of anti-smiking ordinances and regulations, 
the government's distinctively dead-silent policy on disseminating the information 
regarding health hazards of smoking, all of which are specific to Japan, and the puzzling 
peculiarity among the prevailing studies on cigarette demand of positing the cigarette 
demand equation in an ad hoc manner and the absence of a systematic incorporation of 
information in deducing the cigarette demand function. 
The central theme of this paper originates in this author's perception of the low level of 
public awareness regarding health hazards of smoking which is attested to by the Japanese 
smoking behavior. Clearly, as many previous studies have indicated, one dominant form of 
public policy to abate smoking (and hence both private and social costs of smoking through 
smoking-related diseases and deaths) is to raise the price of cigarettes, which is to raise 
"the cost of smoking from without." 
This paper embraces two deductive arguments rendering support to the testable statement 
of hypothesis that the effective use of dissemination of the information regarding smoking-
related health hazards is a potent public policy. One argument is that the dissemination of 
information raises the "cost of smoking from within," and hence reduces cigarette 
consumption. The other argument is a corollary to the first argument: the dissemination of 
information is pivotal to the enactment of anti-smoking ordinances and legislation, through 
elevating public awareness of smoking-related health hazards (because it raises the "cost of 
smoking from within,") and therefore inducing the public and their leadership to place anti-
smoking issues and the need for anti-smoking ordinances on the Japanese political and 
social agenda, both locally and nationwide. Without the elevation of public awareness of 
smoking-related health hazards, the public will neither perceive a need for such ordinances 
and legislation nor support them. 
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